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SYMBOLISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS IN
AGENCY DESIGN
Kristin E. Hickman*
The political polarization of our time has profound implications for the
ability of federal government agencies to perform the functions and accomplish the goals that Congress has given them.1 Congress depends heavily on
agencies to implement and administer government programs, not limited to
but certainly including policymaking through the promulgation of regulations and the adjudication of individual enforcement actions.2 No matter
how doggedly an agency enforces statutory and regulatory requirements,
however, the efficacy of government programs ultimately depends on the
willingness of their targets and beneficiaries to accept and comply with the
pronouncements of the agencies tasked with administering those programs.3
If we want people voluntarily to comply with statutory requirements, we
ought to have some concern for public perceptions regarding the fairness
© 2018 Kristin E. Hickman. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost for educational purposes
so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Distinguished McKnight University Professor and Harlan Albert Rogers Professor
in Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I am thankful to the students of the Notre
Dame Law Review for inviting me to participate in the Symposium for which this Article was
written, and to participants at the Symposium for helpful comments and suggestions.
Thank you also to Jerry Kerska, Bill McGeveran, Peter Shane, Mark Thomson, and students
in my advanced administrative law course for helpful conversations, comments, and
suggestions. Many thanks also to Trevor Matthews and Paul Dimick for outstanding
research assistance.
1 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Essay, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 1739, 1746–48 (2015) (summarizing some of the implications of political polarization
for administrative agencies).
2 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.3 (5th ed. 2010) (observing that agencies are responsible for most of the government’s policy decisions, rules of
conduct, and adjudications of individual cases).
3 IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 20–21 (1992) (recognizing that “[i]ncreasingly within both scholarly
and regulatory communities there is a feeling that the regulatory agencies that do best at
achieving their goals are those that strike some sort of sophisticated balance between”
deterrence of noncompliance through enforcement and penalties versus “gentle persuasion” to secure compliance with legal requirements).
1475
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and legitimacy of agencies and agency action.4 Meanwhile, in the current
political climate, a substantial portion of the electorate questions that fairness and legitimacy.5
Administrative law has seen several cases in recent years focused on
agency design and separation of powers principles. In particular, the
Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have found the statutory design of a
particular federal government agency or office within an agency to be constitutionally flawed on separation of powers grounds.6 When a court finds a
legal problem with an agency’s structure or actions, the traditional remedy is
to vacate the action or actions giving rise to the challenge.7 With structural
deficiencies in an agency’s design, this traditional remedy means that none
of the agency’s actions are valid until Congress resolves the problem. But in
these recent cases, upon finding constitutional violations, the courts’ remedy
du jour has been to take it upon themselves to tweak the details of the challenged agency’s design—specifically, by severing a sentence or two from the
agency’s governing statute to allow particular agency officials to be removed
from office by the President at will rather than only for cause.8 Meanwhile,
the courts left the actions of the challenged agency, and the structures and
actions of identically or similarly designed agencies, largely or entirely
untouched. In short, the challenging parties achieved a symbolic victory in
favor of their vision of the Constitution, but otherwise not much changed.
My goal with this Essay is a modest one: to raise a few reservations
regarding judicial refashioning of agency design via this severance remedy
for separation of powers violations. To that end, the Essay will proceed fairly
straightforwardly. I will describe three cases or sets of cases in which the
Supreme Court or the D.C. Circuit has employed the severance remedy: Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,9 a series of D.C.
Circuit cases brought by the Intercollegiate Broadcasting System against the

4 See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 376–78 (2006) (linking legitimacy, defined as “the belief that authorities, institutions, and social arrangements are appropriate, proper, and just,” with voluntary
compliance with legal requirements).
5 See, e.g., PHILIP WALLACH, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PUB. MGMT. AT BROOKINGS, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE’S LEGITIMACY CRISIS (2016); Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s
Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2017).
6 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010);
PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc, 881
F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018); Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d
1332 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
7 3 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 18.1, at 1675 (5th ed. 2010)
(“In most cases, successful prosecution of a review proceeding yields instead a judicial decision setting aside the agency action and remanding the proceeding for further agency
action not inconsistent with the decision of the reviewing court.”).
8 See, e.g., Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 684 F.3d at 1340–41.
9 561 U.S. 477.
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Copyright Royalty Board,10 and PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau.11 Then I will highlight three reservations I have about using the severance remedy in this way: (1) that the remedy may not reflect the judicial
restraint that motivates it; (2) that the remedy is sufficiently weak that its
repeated use will chill litigation of legitimate constitutional challenges; and
(3) that the remedy makes agency officials more politically accountable
when, arguably, popular understandings of separation of powers principles
might counsel otherwise. To the extent these reservations are accurate, judicial use of the severance remedy to address agency design flaws may, in turn,
exacerbate questions regarding the fairness and legitimacy of agency actions.
I have no grand proposals for addressing these reservations. Conceding
longstanding administrative law precedents, realities of contemporary governance, and institutional constraints faced by the judiciary, I am not even
prepared to say that the severance remedy is not the best alternative available
in at least some agency design cases. To the extent one concludes that the
severance remedy is a problem, the only true solution may be for Congress to
amend existing statutes or think again before getting too creative with agency
design. At a minimum, however, courts ought to at least contemplate the
potential drawbacks, as well as the arguable benefits, before employing the
severance remedy.
I. THREE RECENT AGENCY DESIGN CASES
Perhaps not unlike some academic articles, judicial opinions that
address agency design and separation of powers principles are often rhetorically lofty but abstract and largely detached from the details of the underlying dispute and the day-to-day reality of agency operations. To lay some
groundwork for the concerns I wish to raise, the following paragraphs
describe three recent cases in which the Supreme Court or D.C. Circuit has
used the severance remedy to alter the design of a federal agency after concluding that the statutory scheme governing the agency violated separation
of powers principles.
A. Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB
In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,12 the
Court considered the constitutionality of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB). Congress established the PCAOB as part of the
10 Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 796 F.3d 111 (D.C. Cir.
2015); Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 684 F.3d 1332; Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright
Royalty Bd., 571 F.3d 69 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
11 839 F.3d 1. Although the three-judge panel in PHH applied the severance remedy,
id. at 37–39, the en banc court’s conclusion did not require it to consider the remedy.
PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc).
Nevertheless, separate dissenting opinions authored by Judges Brett Kavanaugh and Karen
LeCraft Henderson debated the severance remedy.
12 561 U.S. 477.
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).13 The PCAOB’s purpose is “to oversee
the audit of companies that are subject to the securities laws, and related
matters, in order to protect the interests of investors and further the public
interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit
reports.”14 SOX called for the SEC to appoint the PCAOB’s members, and
also gave the SEC the power to remove a member of the PCAOB for cause
after an evidentiary hearing.15 SOX gave the PCAOB expansive rulemaking
and enforcement powers, including the authority to conduct investigations
and disciplinary proceedings, and to impose sanctions upon public accounting firms for violating PCAOB rules.16 In short, the PCAOB makes rules governing accountants and uses agency-level adjudication to enforce those rules
by imposing sanctions on accountants who violate them. SOX also gave the
SEC the power to review and potentially reject the PCAOB’s rules, orders,
and sanctions.17
Beckstead and Watts was a small Nevada accounting firm.18 In 2004 and
2005, PCAOB inspectors investigated the firm, issued a publicly available
inspection report criticizing the firm’s auditing practices, and initiated formal enforcement proceedings against the firm.19 Beckstead and Watts filed a
complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and claiming that the
firm’s efforts to comply with PCAOB requirements had forced it to turn away
most of its clients, thereby substantially reducing the firm’s earnings.20 Beckstead and Watts was joined in that action by the Free Enterprise Fund, a
nonprofit membership organization described as “promot[ing] economic
growth, lower taxes, and limited government” that “[sought] to vindicate the
interests of its members . . . subject to the Board’s authority and . . . injured
by the [PCAOB’s] regulations.”21 Although the complaint briefly alleged
that PCAOB requirements were unreasonable for the types of companies that
Beckstead and Watts audited, the complaint did not challenge any particular
PCAOB rule as arbitrary and capricious.22 Rather, the complaint focused
exclusively on constitutional challenges to the PCAOB’s statutory design.23
13 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the
U.S. Code).
14 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2012); see also About the PCAOB, PCAOB https://pcaobus.org/
About (last visited Jan. 25, 2018) (documenting the same on the PCAOB’s website).
15 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(4), (e)(6).
16 Id. § 7211(c).
17 Id. §§ 7211(c), 7217(b)–(c).
18 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 69–70, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub.
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., No. 1:06-cv-00217, 2007 WL 891675 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2007),
aff’d, 537 F.3d. 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
19 Id. ¶¶ 74–79.
20 Id. ¶¶ 73, 77.
21 Id. ¶ 11.
22 Id. ¶ 73.
23 Id. ¶¶ 81–95.
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By the time the case made it to the Supreme Court,24 the issues had been
honed to the following: Did SOX violate separation of powers principles by
restricting the President’s authority to appoint and remove PCAOB members?25 Were PCAOB members principal officers (who should have been
appointed by the President with advice and consent of the Senate) or inferior
officers?26 If the latter, were the SEC’s Commissioners collectively the “head
of a department” for Appointments Clause purposes?27
The Court held that the members of the PCAOB were inferior officers
who could be appointed by the SEC.28 All of the Justices agreed that the SEC
Commissioners, acting collectively, constituted the head of a department eligible to appoint inferior officers under the Appointments Clause.29 But the
Justices differed in their reasoning for why the PCAOB members were inferior officers. The dissenting Justices reasoned that the SEC’s supervisory
authority over the PCAOB’s functions alone offered sufficient basis to conclude that the members of the PCAOB were inferior officers.30 But with
Chief Justice John Roberts writing on behalf of the five-Justice majority, the
Court conditioned its holding on the remedy it imposed: striking a sentence
from SOX limiting the SEC’s power to remove PCAOB members.31 Without
that change, the PCAOB’s statutory design would have been
unconstitutional.
As the Court noted, SOX severely limited the SEC’s power to remove
PCAOB members in three ways. First, SOX established an unusually stringent standard for removing a PCAOB member. Rather than the traditional,
and somewhat mushy, statutory language listing “inefficiency, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance in office” as grounds for removal,32 SOX required specific
24 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 556 U.S. 1234 (2009)
(mem.) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
25 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (No. 08-861) (articulating questions presented).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 510.
29 Id. at 512–13.
30 Id. at 529–30 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
31 Id. at 495–98 (majority opinion).
32 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (2012) (limiting removal of Merit Systems Protection
Board members to such circumstances); 5 U.S.C. § 7104(b) (2012) (same for Federal
Labor Relations Authority members); 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2012) (same for CFPB
Director); 29 U.S.C. § 661(b) (2012) (same for Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission members); 31 U.S.C. § 751(d) (2012) (same for General Accounting Office
Personnel Appeals Board members); 42 U.S.C. § 5841(e) (2012) (same for Nuclear Regulatory Commission members); 46 U.S.C. § 301(b)(5) (2012) (same for Federal Maritime
Commissioners); 49 U.S.C. § 1111(c) (2012) (same for National Transportation Safety
Board members); see also Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487 (noting that the parties to the
case agreed that SEC Commissioners could only be removed by the President pursuant to
that standard); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 622 (1935) (addressing the
constitutionality of such language in connection with the removal of members of the Federal Trade Commission).
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findings that the member “willfully violated” SOX, PCAOB rules, or the
securities laws; “willfully abused” his authority; or “failed to enforce compliance” with SOX, PCAOB rules, or professional standards “without reasonable
justification or excuse.”33 Even then, SOX only authorized removal “as necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or
otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of” the statute or securities laws.34
Second, SOX required the SEC to conduct a formal, on-the-record hearing
in making such findings.35 Third, by requiring a formal SEC order for
removal, SOX subjected any such decision to judicial review.36 Each of these
three features distinguished the removal provision in SOX from those the
Court had previously upheld.37 In considering the SOX removal provision,
the Court suggested that each of those three unusual features raised serious
constitutional concerns.38
Ultimately, however, the Court predicated its assessment that PCAOB
was unconstitutionally designed on the fact that, not only did SOX limit the
SEC’s power to remove PCAOB members, but the President’s authority to
remove SEC Commissioners was also subject to a for-cause limitation—albeit
the more traditional and less restrictive presidential finding of “inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”39 According to the Court, such
“dual for-cause limitations on the removal of [PCAOB] members contravene
the Constitution’s separation of powers” by interfering with the President’s
ability to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.40 “[I]f allowed to
stand, this dispersion of responsibility could be multiplied” by adding more
and more layers of insulation between the President and his subordinates.41
Having found the PCAOB’s statutory design to be unconstitutional, however, the Court declined to impose the standard administrative law remedy of
invalidating the PCAOB’s actions against Beckstead and Watts.42 Instead,
although SOX lacks a severability clause, the Court held that the unconstitutional limits on the President’s removal power could be severed from the rest
of the statute and, accordingly, struck the offending sentence.43 Thus, after
33 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)(3) (2012).
34 Id.
35 Id. § 7211(e)(6).
36 See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 486 (citing provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act and Securities Exchange Act in support of this premise).
37 Id. at 502–03.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 487 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935))
(internal quotation marks omitted). As Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion observed, however, the Securities Exchange Act, which established the SEC, does not contain a provision
limiting the President’s ability to remove SEC Commissioners. Id. at 546 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
40 Id. at 492 (majority opinion).
41 Id. at 497.
42 See 3 PIERCE, supra note 7, § 18.1 (recognizing invalidation as the standard remedy).
43 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 508 (“[W]e agree with the Government that the unconstitutional tenure provisions are severable from the remainder of the statute.”).
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the Court’s decision, the SEC continues to appoint PCAOB members, but
those members are subject to potential at-will removal by the SEC.44 Hence,
the PCAOB members are now inferior officers.
Justice Breyer wrote the dissenting opinion for four Justices. He disagreed that adding a second layer of insulation from potential removal would
interfere with the President’s ability to execute the laws.45 Rather, he
defended that extra degree of removal protection as justified both by the
need to ensure that PCAOB adjudications are undertaken free of political
influence and the need to ensure that the PCAOB will make decisions based
on its expertise rather than on political considerations.46 Regardless, Justice
Breyer devoted a large part of his dissent and two lengthy appendices to documenting the several dozen agencies and hundreds of agency officials across
the federal government with similar dual for-cause removal arrangements.47
As Justice Breyer observed, the Free Enterprise Fund decision raises significant
questions regarding the constitutionality of the actions of all of those agencies and officials.
Meanwhile, with the Court’s adjustment to the PCAOB’s statutory
design, the agency continued to function just as it did before the Free Enterprise Fund litigation commenced. The PCAOB’s proceedings against Beckstead and Watts continued for eight more months, when the parties settled
the matter with the PCAOB withdrawing its formal inspection report and
closing its investigation of the firm, but reserving the authority to pursue
future investigations of the firm’s “past or future conduct.”48
B. The Saga of the Copyright Royalty Board
In 2004, the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act replaced a
system of Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels that relied on professional
arbitrators with a new agency, the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB), that utilized full-time personnel to determine “reasonable terms and rates of royalty
44 Id. at 509 (“Concluding that the removal restrictions are invalid leaves the Board
removable by the Commission at will, and leaves the President separated from Board members by only a single level of good-cause tenure.”); see also Jonathan F. Mitchell, The Writ-ofErasure Fallacy, 104 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (noting that the statute has not actually
changed but rather must be read in conjunction with the Free Enterprise Fund decision).
45 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 533 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that removal insulation creates decisional independence by freeing the decisionmaker from fear of summary
removal and promotes public confidence in decisionmakers).
46 Id. at 522.
47 Id. at 540–45, 549–85.
48 Michael Cohn, Beckstead and Watts Settles Inspection Case with PCAOB, ACCT. TODAY
(Feb. 23, 2011), https://www.accountingtoday.com/news/beckstead-and-watts-settlesinspection-case-with-pcaob; see also Joint Status Report, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., No. 1:06-cv-00217, 2007 WL 891675 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2007),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 561 U.S.
477 (2010); Judgment, Free Enter. Fund, 2007 WL 891675.
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payments” for various copyrighted works.49 Whereas the Copyright Office
had appointed the arbitration panels, the new legislation provided for the
Librarian of Congress to appoint three Copyright Royalty Judges (CRJs), who
sit collectively as the CRB, with one of the three designated as “Chief.”50 The
same legislation authorized the Librarian of Congress to suspend a CRJ for
violating standards of conduct or for “misconduct, neglect of duty, or any
disqualifying physical or mental disability” and, after a hearing, to remove a
CRJ for the same reasons.51 Ratemaking is rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act,52 and the CRB uses formal rulemaking procedures in
making its determinations.53 Nevertheless, formal rulemaking is very triallike, with discovery, oral testimony, and cross-examination of witnesses.54
Correspondingly, the D.C. Circuit has described the CRB’s decisionmaking
process as “adversarial.”55 Hence, perhaps, the reason for labeling the CRB’s
three members as “judges.”
Intercollegiate Broadcasting System (“Intercollegiate”) is a nonprofit
membership organization established in 1940 to serve high school and college radio, television, and now webcasting stations.56 Unhappy with terms
and rates established for webcasters by the CRB, Intercollegiate sought judicial review on behalf of its members in what ultimately became three separate
trips to the D.C. Circuit.
Intercollegiate initially challenged several aspects of the CRB’s webcasting determination as arbitrary and capricious, and the D.C. Circuit upheld
parts of the CRB’s determination and rejected and remanded others for
reconsideration.57 In a supplemental brief filed long after its initial appeal,
Intercollegiate argued also that the appointment of the CRJs by the Librarian
of Congress violated the Appointments Clause.58 Despite allowing the filing
and ordering supplemental briefs in response, in its decision now known as
Intercollegiate I, the D.C. Circuit declined to resolve such an “ ‘important ques49 Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, pmbl.,
§ 3(a), 118 Stat. 2341, 2341 (noting the purpose of the legislation).
50 Id. § 3(a), 118 Stat. 2341–45 (adopting 17 U.S.C. § 801 (2012)).
51 Id. § 3(a), 118 Stat. 2348 (adopting 17 U.S.C. § 802(h), (i)).
52 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)–(5) (2012) (defining “rule” and “rule making” to include “prescribing the future of rates”).
53 See Andrew D. Stephenson, Note, Webcaster II: A Case Study of Business to Business
Rate Setting by Formal Rulemaking, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 393, 405 (2011) (characterizing the
procedures utilized by the CRB as formal rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure
Act).
54 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–557 (providing formal rulemaking procedures); see also JEFFREY S.
LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 50 (5th ed. 2012) (describing formal
rulemaking).
55 Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 571 F.3d 69, 73–74 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (describing CRB proceedings).
56 See About IBS––Intercollegiate Broadcasting System, Inc., IBS, http://
www.collegebroadcasters.us/content/about/index.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2018).
57 Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 571 F.3d at 74.
58 Final Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 3, Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 571 F.3d 69
(Nos. 07-1123, 07-1168, 07-1172, 07-1174, 07-1177, 07-1178).
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tion of far-reaching significance’ on the basis of hasty, inadequate, and
untimely briefing.”59
The Appointments Clause issue returned to the D.C. Circuit a few years
later in Intercollegiate II.60 This time, the government conceded that the CRJs
were officers of the United States, and the court agreed, recognizing that the
CRJs “exercise significant authority”61 by determining rates through application of an open-ended standard that accords them “vast discretion.”62 The
court also concluded that the CRJs were principal officers rather than inferior officers because they could only be removed by the Librarian of Congress
for cause.63 Because principal officers can only be appointed by the President, while the CRJs were appointed by the Librarian, the court’s conclusion
produced a holding that the Act was unconstitutional.64
Following the Supreme Court’s lead from Free Enterprise Fund, however,
the Intercollegiate II court remedied the constitutional flaw by invalidating and
severing the statutory for-cause limitation on the Librarian’s power to remove
CRJs.65 With that provision deleted, the court said that the CRJs would be
inferior officers.66 The court also determined that the Librarian of Congress
is the head of a department for Appointments Clause purposes.67 Accordingly, by removing the statutory removal restriction, the court made the statute constitutional. And, having “fixed” the CRB’s statutory design, the court
remanded the CRB’s webcasting determination for reconsideration.68
The three CRJs reconsidering the webcasting determination were different from those who had issued the webcasting determination originally,
although the turnover appears unrelated to the case.69 The new CRB
59 See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 571 F.3d at 76 (brackets omitted) (quoting Carducci v.
Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
60 Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir.
2012).
61 Id. at 1337, 1339; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125–26 (1976) (per curiam)
(adopting as the standard for distinguishing officers from nonofficers whether the individual in question “exercis[es] significant authority”).
62 Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 684 F.3d at 1339–40.
63 See id. at 1340.
64 See id.
65 See id. at 1340–41.
66 See id. at 1341.
67 See id.
68 See id. at 1342.
69 See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 796 F.3d 111, 114 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (observing that the Librarian of Congress appointed a new CRB after Intercollegiate II). The timing of the turnover appears more coincidental than inspired by the court.
The original three CRJs were James Sledge, Stanley Wisniewski, and William Roberts. See
Press Release, Library of Cong., Librarian of Congress James H. Billington Appoints Three
Copyright Royalty Judges (Jan. 11, 2006), https://www.loc.gov/item/prn-06-010/billing
ton-appoints-three-copyright-royalty-judges/2006-01-11/. Suzanne Barnett was appointed
to succeed James Sledge in April 2012, while Intercollegiate II was pending, after Sledge
completed a statutory six-year term. See Press Release, Library of Cong., Librarian of Congress Names New Chief Copyright Royalty Judge (Apr. 13, 2012), https://www.loc.gov/
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declined to allow the submission of new evidence or conduct additional hearings, however, and instead limited itself to reviewing de novo the written
record supporting the old CRB’s action.70 Based on its review of that
existing record, the new CRB adopted the same terms and rates as the old
CRB.71
In Intercollegiate III, Intercollegiate again challenged the CRB’s webcasting determination, this time claiming that, because the new CRB merely
reviewed their predecessors’ written record rather than pursuing new proceedings, its determination was “tainted” by and merely “enshrine[d] the
constitutional violations that [Intercollegiate II] sought to cure.”72 The D.C.
Circuit rejected that claim, concluding that the new CRB could rely on the
record developed by the old CRB and upholding the new CRB’s action.73
In short, the resolution of the CRB’s saga was a little different from that
of the PCAOB. A new CRB with three new CRJs reconsidered the determination that inspired Intercollegiate’s challenge, whereas the PCAOB remained
practically unchanged as it continued its engagement with Beckstead and
Watts. On the other hand, Intercollegiate ended up with the same dissatisfactory webcasting terms and rates after Intercollegiate III as prompted its suit
in Intercollegiate II, whereas Beckstead and Watts were able, in the end, to
settle with the PCAOB. Presumably, the difference in outcomes is attributable at least partly to the fact that the CRB’s determination was broadly applicable across webcasters, whereas the PCAOB’s actions against Beckstead and
Watts involved an individual enforcement action.
C. PHH Corp. v. CFPB
In PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,74 the D.C. Circuit
addressed the constitutionality of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB). In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) established the CFPB for the purposes of “reguitem/prn-12-081/librarian-names-new-chief-copyright-royalty-judge/2012-04-13/. Stanley
Wisniewski retired in August 2012, shortly after Intercollegiate II was decided, and was
replaced in an interim capacity by Richard Strasser. See Press Release, Library of Cong.,
Librarian of Congress Names Interim Copyright Royalty Judge (Sept. 17, 2012), https://
www.loc.gov/item/prn-12-176/interim-copyright-royalty-judge/2012-09-17/. James Roberts resigned several months later, and the Librarian of Congress appointed David Strickler
and Jesse Feder to replace Wisniewski and Roberts, respectively, in May 2013. See David
Oxenford, Changes at the Copyright Royalty Board—Two New Judges Make for an All-New Board
for the Upcoming Internet Radio Royalty Rate Setting Proceeding, BROADCAST L. BLOG (May 9,
2013), https://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2013/05/articles/changes-at-the-copyright-royalty-board-two-new-judges-make-for-an-all-new-board-for-the-upcoming-internet-radio-royalty-rate-setting-proceeding/.
70 See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 796 F.3d at 116–17.
71 See id. at 117.
72 Id. (quoting Final Brief of Petitioner at 15, Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 796 F.3d 111
(No. 14-1068)).
73 See id. at 126–27.
74 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
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lat[ing] the offering and provision of consumer financial products or services
under the Federal consumer financial laws”75 and “ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products and services and
that markets for consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive.”76 To facilitate these goals, the legislation gave the
CFPB extensive rulemaking77 and enforcement powers,78 including the
authority to issue cease-and-desist orders after formal adjudicatory hearing
procedures.79
The design of the CFPB was an issue of some congressional debate and
compromise, as some members of Congress wanted to insulate the CFPB
from political influence, while others desired more political oversight and
control of the agency.80 Dodd-Frank called for the head of the CFPB to be a
single Director who would be appointed by the President, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to serve for a five-year term and who could only be
removed by the President for cause.81 To give the CFPB even more independence from political influence, the legislation made the CFPB an independent agency and placed it within the Federal Reserve System, thereby
insulating it from the congressional appropriations process and permitting it
to avoid congressional as well as presidential oversight.82
PHH Corp. is a large multinational corporation in the financial services
industry.83 The PHH case arose after an administrative law judge working
for the CFPB concluded that certain business transactions involving two PHH
subsidiaries—a mortgage lender and a mortgage reinsurance provider—violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA).84 The administrative law judge recommended both injunctions and disgorgement of roughly
$6 million in reinsurance premiums.85 The CFPB’s Director upheld the
administrative law judge’s decision that PHH violated RESPA but adopted a
slightly different reading of relevant statutory language to raise the ordered
75 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1011(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010).
76 Id. § 1021(a), 124 Stat. at 1979–80.
77 See id. § 1022, 124 Stat. at 1980–85.
78 See id. §§ 1051–1058, 124 Stat. at 2018–35.
79 See id. § 1053, 124 Stat. at 2025–28.
80 See Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 339–40 (2013) (describing the congressional debate).
81 See § 1011(b)(1)–(2), (c)(3), 124 Stat. at 1964.
82 Id. § 1011(a), 124 Stat. at 1964; see also Levitin, supra note 80, at 339–40 (describing
the CFPB’s structure).
83 See Opening Brief for Petitioners at 10, PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,
839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1177); PHH Corp. by the Numbers, BALT. SUN (Aug. 27,
1991), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-08-27/business/1991239026_1_phh-corpkunisch-real-estate.
84 See Opening Brief for Petitioners, supra note 83, at 10–14.
85 Id. at 14.
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disgorgement to $109 million.86 PHH challenged the order on various
grounds, including the constitutionality of the CFPB’s design.87
A divided D.C. Circuit panel declared the CFPB’s structure as an independent agency headed by a single Director to be unconstitutional as a violation of separation of powers principles.88 Writing at great length for the
court, Judge Brett Kavanaugh contended that independent agencies in general raise constitutional concerns because they are “unchecked” by presidential oversight.89 To compensate for this shortcoming and to protect
individual liberty, he said, independent agencies traditionally are headed by
multimember commissions to diffuse agency power across several commissioners and foster collaborative decisionmaking.90 Pointing to a long line of
Supreme Court precedents including Free Enterprise Fund,91 Judge Kavanaugh
argued that historical practice is an important guide to applying separation
of powers principles.92 By deviating from the traditional multimember structure, he said, the CFPB’s single-director model is unconstitutional.93
Again citing Free Enterprise Fund as well as the D.C. Circuit’s Intercollegiate
II94 decision, the court remedied the constitutional difficulty by striking the
for-cause limitation on the President’s ability to remove the CFPB Director
from office.95 “The President of the United States now has the power to
supervise and direct the Director of the CFPB, and may remove the Director
at will at any time.”96
The D.C. Circuit granted en banc review in PHH and, ultimately,
declared the CFPB’s single-director design to be constitutional.97 Thus, the
for-cause limitation on the President’s ability to remove the CFPB’s Director
from office has been restored. In light of the en banc court’s holding,
86 Id. at 15–16.
87 PHH, 839 F.3d at 7.
88 Id. at 36. Judge A. Raymond Randolph joined Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion for the
court but wrote a separate concurring opinion to express the view that the ALJ whose
decision the CFPB Director confirmed in finding that PHH violated RESPA was improperly
appointed under the Constitution’s Appointments Clause. Id. at 55 (Randolph, J., concurring). Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing
with Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion rejecting the CFPB’s interpretation of RESPA on statutory
grounds, but contending that the court’s resolution of the statutory question made consideration of the constitutional issue unnecessary. Id. at 56 (Henderson, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
89 See id. at 8 (majority opinion).
90 Id.
91 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010); see also
supra Section I.A (describing this case).
92 PHH, 839 F.3d at 21–24.
93 Id. at 36.
94 Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir.
2012); see also supra Section I.B (describing this case).
95 PHH, 839 F.3d at 39.
96 Id.
97 PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en
banc).
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neither the majority opinion nor most of the separate concurring and dissenting opinions filed in the case discussed the severance remedy.98 Writing
in dissent, based on reasoning similar to that of his prior opinion for the
panel, Judge Kavanaugh continued to maintain that the CFPB’s single-director model is unconstitutional and that severing the statutory language limiting the President’s removal power constitutes the appropriate remedy.
Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson dissented separately, offering her own
analysis of why the CFPB’s design violates Article II of the Constitution, but
disagreeing with Judge Kavanaugh principally with respect to his proposed
remedy.99 Eliminating the removal restriction would make the CFPB
“responsive to the President” and would upset Congress’s intended balance
between the legislative and executive branches.100 Labeling the CFPB’s independence as its “sine qua non,”101 she said, “Congress would not have created” the agency with a structure and powers as Judge Kavanaugh’s limited
remedy would leave in place.102 Although Dodd-Frank includes a severability
clause, such a provision “is [not] a license to cut out the ‘heart’ of a statute.”103 Other structural adjustments that would solve the perceived constitutional difficulty while preserving the Agency’s independence require
adding as well as subtracting statutory text, and such rewrites are beyond the
powers of the judiciary.104 Accordingly, Judge Henderson would “invalidate”
the CFPB “top to bottom” and strike all of the statutory provisions creating
the CFPB and establishing its powers.105
II. THREE RESERVATIONS
With each of the above-described cases, a court (or, in the PHH case,
Judges Kavanaugh and Randolph) found the agency design in question
98 Collectively, the en banc court filed seven separate opinions running approximately
250 pages. The majority opinion, authored by Judge Cornelia Pillard, represented six of
the ten participating judges. Judge David Tatel filed a concurring opinion joined by
Judges Patricia Millett and Pillard stating that they would have resolved the statutory interpretation question in the CFPB’s favor as well. Id. at 111 (Tatel, J., concurring). Judge
Robert Wilkins filed a concurring opinion, joined by Judge Judith Rogers, offering additional grounds in support of the majority’s holding. Id. at 113–14 (Wilkins, J., concurring). Judge Thomas Griffith concurred in the judgment only based on his own
interpretation of the statutory removal restriction. Id. at 124 (Griffith, J., concurring in the
judgment). Judges Karen LeCraft Henderson, Brett Kavanaugh, and A. Raymond Randolph each filed a separate dissenting opinion, although Judge Randolph also joined
Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent. Id. at 137 (Henderson, J., dissenting); id. at 164 (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting); id. at 200 (Randolph, J., dissenting). Of all of those opinions, only those
authored by Judges Henderson and Kavanaugh discussed the severance remedy.
99 See id. at 139 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 162–63.
101 Id. at 161–62 (quoting amici defending the CFPB).
102 Id. at 139, 163.
103 Id. at 163 (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 691 (1987)).
104 See id.
105 Id. at 164.
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unconstitutional and resolved the constitutional defect by severing just a
small amount of statutory language to adjust the agency’s structure to satisfy
separation of powers principles. At first blush, the severance remedy has
much to recommend it. In each of these cases, the constitutional infirmities
were resolved with the least amount of day-to-day disruption possible. In
practical terms, the agencies continued to function much as they had. For
those who value judicial restraint, the severance remedy might seem ideal—
resolving constitutional problems while minimizing judicial intrusion into
the legislative and regulatory spheres. For those who may care less about
judicial restraint but support the agencies and their functions, the severance
remedy probably seems a godsend.
Of course, the regulated parties who raised the challenges in the first
place may feel a little less satisfied. In both Free Enterprise Fund and the CRB
litigation, the challenging parties won, but the agency actions that prompted
them to bring those cases at the outset remained unchanged by the supposedly favorable court decision. The enforcement proceedings that prompted
Free Enterprise Fund continued for several months after the Supreme Court
declared the PCAOB’s design unconstitutional, ending only when the parties
agreed to a settlement.106 The webcasting terms and rates at the heart of the
CRB litigation did not change at all.107 In PHH, the court (both panel and
en banc) declared that the CFPB’s interpretation of the statute was flawed,108
so the challenging parties had the satisfaction of overturning the agency
action at issue. But with Judge Kavanaugh’s application of the severance
remedy, the CFPB would have continued to function much as if the case had
never happened, notwithstanding the finding that the agency’s design was
unconstitutional.
Beyond the potential disappointment of the challenging parties themselves, upon further consideration, the severance remedy raises concerns.
These concerns may or may not be sufficient to outweigh the benefits of the
severance remedy, and the balance of concerns versus benefits may differ
from case to case. Nevertheless, before the courts wholeheartedly embrace
the severance remedy as a solution to agency design problems, they may wish
to at least reflect a little more carefully upon the potential implications.
A. Judicial Restraint, or Perhaps Not?
Judicial restraint clearly motivates the courts’ use of the severance remedy to resolve unconstitutional agency design issues. Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the Supreme Court in Free Enterprise Fund, nodded in that
direction. In explaining why severing the removal restriction language from
SOX was the appropriate remedy in that case, Roberts described the petition106 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
107 See supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text.
108 PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 9–10 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see
also PHH, 881 F.3d at 83 (en banc) (reinstating the panel’s rejection of the CFPB’s interpretation of RESPA).
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ers’ proposed remedy of invalidating all of the PCAOB’s actions as
“broad.”109 By comparison, he said that, “ ‘[g]enerally speaking, when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to limit the solution to the
problem,’ severing any ‘problematic portions while leaving the remainder
intact.’ ”110 Judge Brett Kavanaugh echoed the same point in PHH.111
Yet Chief Justice Roberts’s justification for why the Court’s chosen remedy was the most limited was brief. Drawing from various Court precedents
discussing severability, Chief Justice Roberts defended severing the SOX’s
removal restriction on two grounds. First, he offered that the rest of the
statute would remain “fully operative as a law” and was “not ‘incapable of
functioning independently’ ” if the Court struck the removal restriction.112
Second, although SOX lacked a severability clause, Chief Justice Roberts construed that silence as congressional acquiescence, saying that “nothing in the
statute’s text or historical context makes it ‘evident’ that Congress, faced with
the limitations imposed by the Constitution, would have preferred no Board
at all to a Board whose members are removable at will.”113 He then rejected
other possible modifications to the statute, such as altering the PCAOB’s statutory responsibilities “so that its members would no longer be ‘Officers of the
United States’ ” or “restrict[ing] the [PCAOB’s] enforcement powers,” as “far
more extensive than” the chosen remedy of severing the removal
restriction.114
Subsequently writing for the D.C. Circuit in Intercollegiate II, Judge Stephen Williams merely cited Free Enterprise Fund and offered that severing the
removal restriction for CRJs would fix the constitutional difficulty in that
case.115 By comparison, Judge Kavanaugh in PHH offered a more extensive
justification for why severing the removal restriction for the CFPB’s Director
is a more restrained remedy than preventing the CFPB from continuing to
operate.116
Judge Kavanaugh drew from Free Enterprise Fund a two-part test of
whether “(i) Congress would have preferred the law with the offending provision severed over no law at all; and (ii) the law with the offending provision
severed would remain ‘fully operative as a law.’ ”117 Regarding the first of
these two elements, Judge Kavanaugh suggested looking for a severability
109 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508 (2010).
110 Id. (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328–29
(2006)).
111 See PHH, 839 F.3d at 37.
112 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 509 (first quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 186 (1992); then quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 509–10.
115 Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 1340–41
(D.C. Cir. 2012).
116 See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en
banc) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); PHH, 839 F.3d at 8–9.
117 PHH, 839 F.3d at 37 (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 509).
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clause.118 The Dodd-Frank Act contained one: “ ‘If any provision’ of the Act
‘is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of’ the Act ‘shall not be
affected thereby.’ ”119 Moving on to the second element, Judge Kavanaugh
said that striking the for-cause removal restriction would allow both DoddFrank and the CFPB to continue functioning.120 Echoing Chief Justice Roberts in Free Enterprise Fund, Judge Kavanaugh suggested that other courtimposed statutory rewrites such as “restructuring the CFPB as a multi-member independent agency” would go too far, requiring the court to step “far
beyond [its] judicial capacity.”121
Legal scholars have questioned, however, whether the severance remedy
is really as restrained as it might seem. David Gans has suggested that the
severance remedy lacks meaningful constraints and gives courts too much
power to rewrite statutes, thereby cutting off dialogue between courts and
legislatures and giving legislatures an incentive to disregard possible constitutional constraints when drafting legislation.122 John Harrison has argued
that the comparatively limited impact of the severance remedy may
embolden courts to address issues they might otherwise (and more properly)
avoid.123 Harrison is particularly critical of lower court applications of the
remedy, as with the D.C. Circuit in Intercollegiate Broadcasting II and PHH,
suggesting that severance of statutory text is more appropriately reserved for
the Supreme Court.124
Even if one accepts the severance remedy as a reasonable alternative for
some types of constitutional violations, however, one can still question
whether responding to separation of powers violations by severing a statutory
removal restriction to alter an agency’s structure is restrained. The reasoning on this issue in Free Enterprise Fund but also in PHH is at best incompletely
articulated, if not outright shallow. Both Free Enterprise Fund and PHH seem
to gauge the extent of the reviewing court’s restraint or violence to the statute by reference to the number of words or provisions in the statute affected.
Changing more words would intrude more on the legislature’s prerogative,
so changing fewer words must be more restrained. Chief Justice Roberts is
almost explicit in this regard, rejecting the alternative of “blue-pencil[ing] a
sufficient number of the Board’s responsibilities” as exercising too much
“editorial freedom” more appropriately left to Congress without further
118 Id.
119 Id. at 38 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 5302 (2012)).
120 See id.
121 Id. at 38–39 (emphasis omitted).
122 See David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 639,
663–87 (2008) (raising objections to severance as a remedy).
123 See John Harrison, Severability, Remedies, and Constitutional Adjudication, 83 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 56, 70–80 (2014) (making this argument specifically with respect to Free
Enterprise Fund as well as NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)).
124 Id. at 97–100 (raising this criticism particularly with respect to Intercollegiate Broadcasting II).
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explanation.125 Judge Kavanaugh was undoubtedly correct that adding words
to “create a variety of new offices, designate one of the offices as Chair, and
specify various administrative details” to restructure the CFPB as a multimember independent agency would be relatively unrestrained.126 But he did not
directly address the alternative of striking more language but less than the
whole of Dodd-Frank—as, for example, “strik[ing] down at least those statutory provisions creating the CFPB and defining the CFPB’s duties and authorities,” which he suggested earlier in his analysis might be a possibility.127
Perhaps instead of focusing merely on the number of words severed,
however, Chief Justice Roberts and Judge Kavanaugh were taking the position that judicial restraint required leaving in place a functioning agency to
administer the statutes at issue. Indeed, both Chief Justice Roberts in Free
Enterprise Fund and Judge Kavanaugh in PHH seem of the view that the purposes of Congress with SOX and Dodd-Frank can be served only by preserving ongoing agency operations as well as the statutes’ substantive legal
requirements. At that point, however, their analysis in these opinions conflates the continued operation of the agency tasked with implementing and
enforcing a statute with the operation of the statute itself.
Certainly, declaring an administering agency’s structure to be unconstitutional and the agency’s actions to be inoperative will stop the issuance of
regulations elaborating a statute’s terms and the actual enforcement of a statute’s requirements for some period of time while Congress works to fix the
agency’s structure. But temporarily delaying regulation drafting and active
enforcement is not synonymous with invalidating a statute altogether. Even
an outright declaration that the government will not pursue enforcement
against private parties for their failure to follow statutory commands does not
nullify the statute’s legal force. The very reason why applying the severance
remedy to restructure an agency does not stop the rest of the statute from
functioning—one of the criteria evaluated in both Free Enterprise Fund and
PHH—is that statutory prohibitions and requirements with respect to private
party behavior do not depend upon the existence of an enforcing agency to
function as law. Or are we now so cynical that we think private parties will
only obey the law if the stick of government enforcement hovers in the
background?
Moreover, temporarily halting the functions of an agency does not necessarily eliminate that enforcement stick. Some statutes may contain limitations periods precluding enforcement actions after too much time has
passed. But so long as a statute’s prohibitions and requirements remain in
place, and so long as Congress moves expeditiously to resolve the constitutional difficulty, the now-constitutional successor agency should be able to
pursue subsequent enforcement actions against private parties for behavior
125 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 509–10
(2010).
126 PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en
banc) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
127 PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
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during the interim. Judge Kavanaugh in PHH seemed at least somewhat
aware of the distinction between agency operations and a statute’s legal force
when he suggested that “the CFPB’s operation as an executive agency will not
in any way prevent the overall Dodd-Frank Act from remaining operative as a
law.”128 But he ignored that an inoperative CFPB similarly would not stop
the Dodd-Frank Act from operating as law.
Meanwhile, Chief Justice Roberts and Judge Kavanaugh ignored altogether the severance remedy’s disruption of the legislative compromises that
often go into crafting an agency’s design in the first place. In all three of the
examples discussed in this Essay, Congress actively deliberated how best to
design the agencies it was creating. Agency design was thoroughly considered and deliberately chosen to accomplish legislative goals. And in all three
instances, creating the agency in question was not merely incidental to, but
rather a significant part of, the legislation establishing it.
Creating an agency to oversee the accounting industry was a key component of SOX.129 In fashioning the PCAOB for this purpose, Congress considered establishing the PCAOB as independent from the SEC as well as the
executive branch, but ultimately opted to subordinate the PCAOB to the
SEC’s supervision and control.130 SOX enjoyed bipartisan support, though
only after extensive discussion and debate over the PCAOB’s design.131
Replacing Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels with the CRB was Congress’s principal goal with the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act
of 2004.132 Legislative discussion about the CRB’s design does not seem to
have been especially contentious. Congress shifted appointment responsibility from the Copyright Office to the Librarian of Congress expressly to satisfy
constitutional requirements.133 But concerned about losing the Copyright
Office’s expertise, Congress also required the Librarian to consult with that
office in making CRB appointments.134
Congress initially contemplated making the CFPB a multimember independent agency before settling on the single-director model rejected by the
128 Id. at 38.
129 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE
§§ 1:8–10 (2016).
130 See Richard H. Pildes, Putting Power Back into Separation of Powers Analysis: Why the
SEC-PCAOB Structure Is Constitutional, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 85, 93–94 (2009); Warren
Richey, Can Congress Create Agencies Insulated from White House Control?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 5, 2009), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2009/1205/can-congresscreate-agencies-insulated-from-white-house-control.
131 See Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 996–1006 (2005) (documenting the legislative process leading to the PCAOB’s creation, including various design alternatives
proposed and the final House and Senate vote margins).
132 Pub. L. No. 108-419, pmbl., 118 Stat. 2341, 2341.
133 See H.R. Rep. NO. 108-408, at 22 (2004).
134 See id.
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D.C. Circuit three-judge panel.135 Congress additionally discussed at length
insulating the CFPB from political influence by exempting it from the congressional appropriations process.136 As ably documented in Judge Henderson’s PHH dissent, the CFPB’s structure and Dodd-Frank as a whole were
both hotly debated and enormously controversial.137 Dodd-Frank passed
Congress on a largely party-line vote.138
In short, to varying degrees, the design of all of these agencies was both
at the heart of the legislation creating them and determined through legislative debate and compromise. It is nearly impossible for the courts to know
which adjustments and compromises were essential to the enactment of the
associated legislation. Yet the courts, with a flick of a pen, and without hesitation, altered those legislative compromises. Maybe Congress should be a little more attuned to and respectful of separation of powers principles when it
designs these agencies in the first place. But eliminating a removal restriction undermines that legislative give and take.
B. Potential for Chilling Valid Legal Claims
As should be evident with both the PCAOB and the CFPB, Congress
presently has no qualms about designing new agencies in ways that push the
constitutional envelope. It is up to the courts, therefore, to keep Congress
within constitutional boundaries. Indeed, as Justice Breyer observed in Free
Enterprise Fund, the dual-cause removal restriction the Court deemed unconstitutional in that case is replicated in dozens of agencies and hundreds of
individual officials across the federal government. Given that the litigants in
the agency design cases have repeatedly received the weak remedy of statutory severance, however, another question is whether people will continue to
litigate these cases. Litigation is time consuming and expensive. And, as
Kent Barnett has observed, regulated parties that appear often before an
agency might be wary of engendering hostility by challenging the agency’s
structure if the severance remedy is all the reviewing court will provide.139
135 See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, at 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016),
rev’d en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018); see also Todd Zywicki, The Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace?, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 860–61 (2013).
136 See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 162 & n.19 (D.C. Cir.
2018) (en banc) (Henderson, J., dissenting).
137 See, e.g., Zywicki, supra note 134, at 860–64 (documenting the controversy over the
CFPB’s structure).
138 See Recent Legislation, Administrative Law––Agency Design––Dodd-Frank Act Creates the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 124 HARV. L. REV. 2123, 2124–25 (2011); Binyamin
Appelbaum & David M. Herszenhorn, Financial Overhaul Signals Shift on Deregulation, N.Y.
TIMES (July 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/business/16regulate.html?
pagewanted=print.
139 See Kent Barnett, To the Victor Goes the Toil—Remedies for Regulated Parties in Separationof-Powers Litigation, 92 N.C. L. REV. 481, 485 (2014) [hereinafter Barnett, To the Victor]; see
also Kent Barnett, Standing for (and up to) Separation of Powers, 91 IND. L.J. 665, 714–16
(2016) (arguing for “maximal remedies”).
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“[L]imited remedies and frequent interaction with agencies sometimes
encourage timidity in challenging administrative structure.”140
Good reasons exist to believe that at least some parties will continue to
bring such challenges. A large multinational corporation like PHH, facing
more than $100 million in additional penalties based purely on differing
interpretations of statutory text, is likely to challenge the agency’s action on
whatever grounds may be available to it, including a claim that the agency’s
design is unconstitutional. Likewise, perhaps, a small business like Beckstead
and Watts that believes its very viability as a going concern may be at stake
might be motivated to pursue such litigation. For that matter, hope truly
does spring eternal,141 and some challenging parties may genuinely believe
that their cases are different from past ones and will yield more concretely
beneficial outcomes.
Additionally, legal scholars have recognized that litigation often is driven
by noneconomic values and goals rather than rational economic calculation.142 The emergence and expansion of cause lawyering means that parties
who lack the means to pursue protracted litigation can find sophisticated
lawyers willing to advance their claims.143 For that matter, Ben Depoorter
has suggested that “litigation entrepreneurs” in the cause litigation space may
even pursue litigation that they know they will lose in order to raise awareness and accomplish their long-term goals.144
Free Enterprise Fund exemplifies these points. Brad Beckstead, managing
partner of the accounting firm that challenged the PCAOB’s structure in Free
Enterprise Fund, later articulated broader motivations:
Our best-case scenario would have been for the Supreme Court to strike
down certain provisions of the SOX Act and toss it back to Congress so small
business lobbyists could push them for exemptive relief, but I think this case
brought to light the burden that over-regulation and over-zealous inspectors
can place on the shoulders of small business.145

Free Enterprise Fund, which joined Beckstead and Watts in their suit
against the PCAOB, was known more for lobbying than pursuing cause litigation, but was dedicated to an ideological agenda consistent with the account140 Barnett, To the Victor, supra note 138, at 510.
141 See, e.g., Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man: Epistle I, POETRY FOUND., https://
www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/44899/an-essay-on-man-epistle-I (last visited Apr. 4,
2018) (“Hope springs eternal in the human breast . . . .”).
142 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 15–23
(2000) (summarizing the academic literature and discussing alternative reasons for pursuing litigation).
143 Patrick J. Bumatay, Causes, Commitments, and Counsels: A Study of Political and Professional Obligations Among Bush Administration Lawyers, 31 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 4–10 (2007)
(describing features of cause lawyering as compared with conventional lawyering).
144 See Ben Depoorter, Essay, The Upside of Losing, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 817, 821–24
(2013).
145 Cohn, supra note 48.
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ing firm’s claims.146 One anticipates that the participation of conservative
legal luminaries such as Kenneth Starr, Viet Dinh, Michael Carvin, and Noel
Francisco on behalf of the petitioners in that case was attributable to Free
Enterprise Fund, rather than Beckstead and Watts, seeking them out.
On the other hand, Kent Barnett is undoubtedly correct that parties
considering whether to challenge agency action will take into account the
available remedies (or lack thereof). Judicial reliance on a weak severance
remedy surely will cause some parties to decide not to litigate in the first
instance. As noted, the constitutional issues highlighted in the abovedescribed cases may be replicated elsewhere in the regulatory state. The
weakness of the severance remedy seems to have encouraged those agencies
to continue their activities unconcerned about their potential litigation exposure. Thus, whether or not parties subjected to or targeted by the actions of
such agencies possess the willingness and wherewithal to pursue litigation
challenging the agencies’ design, the mere fact that those agencies continue
to operate unfettered by the Court’s decisions seems likely to increase the
cynicism of regulated parties regarding the agencies’ legitimacy.
C. Symbolism and Legitimacy
My third and last concern about the severance remedy is its adequacy to
preserve public perceptions of agency legitimacy. My thoughts on this point,
however, rely more on personal observation and intuition than scholarly
analysis. To illuminate this concern, therefore, I offer anecdotes from two
conversations with nonlawyers in my life.
First, in August 2017, I was visiting an old friend, a Canadian citizen, in
her hometown of Ottawa––Canada’s capital city. My friend is a longtime
Canadian civil servant who holds a high-level managerial position in her government’s equivalent to one of our cabinet-level departments. My friend is
smart and highly educated, but not a lawyer, and she lived in the United
States for three years as a child and learned some of our nation’s history. She
routinely interacts with U.S. government officials as part of her job, but she
does not follow our political arguments closely, nor is she an expert on the
U.S. Constitution or scholarly debates regarding its meaning.
As my friend was guiding my family and me on a tour of downtown
Ottawa, including Parliament Hill, she mentioned that the Canadian
Supreme Court would be housed for a few years in a downtown office building while its historic home underwent renovation. The office building in
question is adjacent to another office building that houses the Canadian
Department of Justice. The two buildings are connected by a pedestrian tunnel and an elevated, enclosed walkway to protect people walking from one
building to the other from wind, rain, and snow. The tunnel and the walkway would be not only closed but physically blocked by walls for the duration
of the Canadian Supreme Court’s occupancy in the first office building.
146 See, e.g., Kate Ackley, Free Enterprise Fund Walks the Walk, ROLL CALL, July 27, 2005,
2005 WLNR 11780875 (describing the origins and activities of the Free Enterprise Fund).
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When I asked my friend why the Canadian government would block the tunnel and walkway—expending government resources and inconveniencing
pedestrians—her response was, “Separation of powers.” Her point was that
judges need to be independent of political influence from executive branch
officials. When I observed that judicial independence is more a matter of
mental attitudes, systemic influences, and structural protections, rather than
physical walls, she simply shrugged and said, “It’s symbolic.” Indeed, some
quick research turned up a Canadian news article quoting a representative of
the Canadian government as saying that physically blocking the tunnel and
walkway will “ensure the conceptual and operational independence of the
Supreme Court of Canada is maintained during their interim occupancy.”147
Of course, this was one conversation with one individual, and a Canadian at that. Nevertheless, Canada is a democratic country with its own, parliamentary version of separated and shared powers148 and with an educated
populace that at least casually contemplates how its government functions.
Regardless, that conversation came to mind a few months later, as I listened
to my teenaged son recount lessons from his eighth-grade social studies class,
wherein he was learning about the structure of American government.
Consistent with recollections from my own junior high school American
history class some decades ago, my son learned that the U.S. government has
three branches that to some extent share powers but for the most part perform different functions: the legislative branch, or Congress, enacts laws; the
executive branch, consisting of the President and his subordinates, executes
and enforces laws; and the judicial branch, meaning the courts, decides individual cases and, in so doing, interprets laws—that sort of thing. Of course,
reality is more complicated, and judges, lawyers, and scholars analyze,
debate, and appreciate the nuances and complexities of American government. But most Americans are not judges, lawyers, or scholars. Most Americans likely understand American government in terms closer to the lessons of
my son’s social studies class. And I realized that, rightly or wrongly, my son’s
lessons on separation of powers are framed in fairly formalist terms.149
147 Dean Beeby, Walkway Barrier Planned to Ensure Supreme Court’s Independence, CBC
NEWS (Aug. 10, 2017), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/supreme-court-makeover-westmemorial-walkway-1.4224491.
148 See, e.g., Joseph E. Magnet, Separation of Powers in Canada, CONST. L. CAN., http://
www.constitutional-law.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24&Item
id=38 (last visited Jan. 3, 2018) (contending that the Canadian constitution institutes a
“very real structural separation of powers” despite adopting a “parliamentary government
[that] fuses the legislative and the executive branches”).
149 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Prolegomenon to Any Future Administrative Law Course: Separation
of Powers and the Transcendental Deduction, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 885, 887–93 (2005) (developing definitions of formalism and functionalism). Although Lawson is undoubtedly correct
that “ordinary people . . . uncorrupted by advanced degrees” might find his methodological definition of formalism “odd,” id. at 888–89, his explanation as to why, under his definition, many administrative agencies would be inconsistent with constitutional requirements
seems to be more consistent with the understanding of separation of powers principles
espoused by such ordinary people as my friend and my son. See id. at 888–89.
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Taken together, these anecdotes yield a few related revelations. The first
is that there is a certain symbolism associated with formal adherence to separation of powers principles that hits many ordinary people at a very visceral
level and contributes to perceptions of the fairness and legitimacy of government actors in a democratic society. The second is that popular understandings of separation of powers principles anticipate that some government
actors will be politically accountable and others will be independent of politics. Elected officials are paradigmatic examples of the former. Article III
judges are paradigmatic examples of the latter. My third revelation, unfortunately, is that the severance remedy as applied by the courts in Free Enterprise
Fund, Intercollegiate Broadcasting II, and PHH does not fit very well with the
first two revelations.
Agencies have always fit a little oddly with the Constitution’s tripartite
structure, at least when blending quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers
with traditional executive functions. As a result, on a continuum of democratic legitimacy with political accountability on one end and independence
from politics on the other, agency officials, to varying degrees, fall somewhere in the murky middle.
Most agencies are headed by political appointees nominated not only for
their subject-matter expertise but also for their willingness to pursue priorities consistent with the President’s political agenda. When agencies engage
in notice-and-comment rulemaking, the rules and regulations they develop
are quasi-legislative and inherently policy oriented. The procedures agencies
follow in adopting rules and regulations emphasize public participation,
transparency, and accountability in a manner reasonably characterized as a
second-best proxy to the legislative process. Elections have consequences,
and past experience tells us that agency rules and regulations will sometimes
change in response to electoral politics, notwithstanding judicial efforts to
constrain agencies to reasoned decisionmaking. Maximizing the political
accountability of agency officials—for example, by giving the President the
ability to remove them—correspondingly facilitates the political legitimacy of
administrative action.
By comparison, when agencies adjudicate in the manner of the PCAOB
or the CFPB,150 or seem to in the manner of the CRB,151 the procedures they
follow more clearly resemble a judicial trial. Here the expectation is that
agencies will not act politically and decisionmaking will be more neutral. In
other words, the political legitimacy of agency adjudications turns substantially on the perception that adjudicative decisionmakers are independent of
political influence—like judges. Even the formal rulemaking procedures followed by the CRB incorporate elements, like a ban on ex parte communica150

MICHAEL ASIMOW, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS OUTSIDE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (2016), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/adjudication-outside-the-administrative-procedure-act-draft-report.pdf
(describing types of agency adjudications).
151 See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text (discussing CRB procedures).

THE
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tions with decisionmakers, aimed at emphasizing the supposed neutrality of
the decisionmaking process.152
The Supreme Court has long acknowledged and accepted that the same
agency may engage in both rulemaking and adjudication, which creates a
certain tension that nevertheless is not insurmountable so long as agency
officials maintain a certain separation between those two functions.153 Yet,
since the case known as Chenery II in 1947, the Supreme Court has allowed
agencies to exercise policymaking discretion through adjudication as well as
through rulemaking.154 And the Court’s jurisprudence additionally counsels
courts to review agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes advanced
through formal adjudication procedures under the highly deferential Chevron standard.155 These decisions may reflect the reality of agency decisionmaking, but they also countenance conscious and deliberate policymaking
through decisionmaking formats in which, given popular understandings of
separation of powers principles, private parties may anticipate greater independence from political influence. In other words, cases like Chenery II and
Chevron collapse the two ends of the democratic legitimacy continuum—
political accountability and independence from political influence—in on
one another, and thus intensify the tension created by combining both
rulemaking and adjudication functions within the same agency. In light of
this tension, designing agencies to strike the right balance between political
accountability and independence from political influence becomes even
more critical.
Congress cannot design agencies in a manner that violates constitutional
principles. And, ultimately, whether a particular agency design is constitutional is a question for the Supreme Court rather than for Congress to
resolve.156 But within constitutional boundaries as defined by the Court,
Congress is in a better position than the courts to ascertain where the right
balance between political accountability and independence from political
influence lies. The severance remedy as employed in Free Enterprise Fund and
Intercollegiate Broadcasting, and as Judge Kavanaugh would apply it in PHH,
alters that congressionally determined balance. Again, both Free Enterprise
Fund and PHH concerned the actions of agency officials using adjudication
procedures to evaluate whether the private parties broke the law, while Intercollegiate Broadcasting II involved officials who bore the title of “judge” and
pursued in proceedings that, while legally constituting formal rulemaking,
152 See Lubbers, supra note 54, at 50.
153 See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 52 (1975) (permitting the combination of
rulemaking and adjudication powers within the same agency so long as some separation of
functions is maintained).
154 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
155 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27, 230 (2001); see also Negusie
v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 513–15 (2009) (evaluating agency adjudication using the Chevron
standard); United States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305 (2009) (same); SEC v. Zandford, 535
U.S. 813 (2002) (same).
156 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
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nevertheless would have seemed largely adversarial and trial-like to participants and observers. One would expect the agency design objective in such
circumstances to be greater independence from political influence. Yet, in
striking statutory removal restrictions, the courts in those cases removed one
of the structural shields protecting the agency officials in question from political influence. Thus, agency officials engaged or seemingly engaged in adjudicative functions were made less independent and more politically
accountable.
On the other hand, perhaps what inspired the severance remedy in
these cases more broadly was the recognition that the agency officials in question were not and could never be truly independent of politics and policy in
the way that Article III judges are. Again, in a world in which Chenery II and
Chevron are black letter law, agencies use adjudications to advance policy
preferences and receive Chevron deference for interpretive choices with policy implications. Although the agency actions in question may have been or
looked like adjudications, the decisionmakers were also policymakers.
Hence, perhaps, moving these agency officials in a more politically accountable direction is appropriate.
I do not know where the right spot between political accountability and
independence from political influence lies for the PCAOB, the CRB, or the
CFPB. But I am not sure the courts do, either. At least, none of Free Enterprise Fund, Intercollegiate Broadcasting II, nor PHH engaged this question
before severing statutory removal restrictions. Moreover, the Intercollegiate
Broadcasting II court in particular seemed to interpret Free Enterprise Fund as
creating a one-size-fits-all remedy for constitutional deficiencies in agency
design, without inquiring more carefully into whether the remedy that made
sense for one agency did so for another. More thorough, and less rote, consideration is needed.
CONCLUSION
So where does this leave us? Given the unrepresentativeness of the
fourth branch, public perceptions of agency fairness and legitimacy are crucial if we want people to have faith in government agencies and the rule of
law and, correspondingly, to comply with regulatory mandates. To a great
extent, the existing tension between political accountability and independence from political influence with respect to agency officials is baked into
the agency cake. If litigants and observers are especially sophisticated regarding constitutional jurisprudence and are inspired by principled and passionate beliefs regarding the nuances of agency design, perhaps severing a small
bit of statutory text is sufficient to assuage their concerns in some instances,
while at most minimally interfering with agency activities. In declaring
agency structures unconstitutional, the courts are rightly concerned about
overstepping their role and intruding upon legislative prerogatives with their
remedies. Correspondingly, if more pragmatically, the courts are rightly wary
of wreaking havoc on the day-to-day functioning of government agencies.
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There’s no need to kill a fly with a baseball bat when a newspaper will do the
trick.
The current political climate, however, features a fair amount of skepticism among many Americans regarding the fairness and legitimacy of the
administrative state and a “business as usual” approach to agency actions.
Failing to account for those concerns in remedying unconstitutional agency
design flaws is a mistake. Courts ought to at least contemplate a little more
thoroughly whether the severance remedy is adequate to the task.

